Reconciliation Payments in the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Advanced Program and Reductions in Clinical Spending Needed for CMS to Avoid Financial Losses.

This study examines the magnitude of reconciliation payments and clinical spending reductions necessary for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to break even in the first 4 performance periods of the BPCI-A (Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Advanced) program.

The Association Between Orthopaedic Surgeon Academic Productivity Metrics and Compensation from Medical Industry.

INTRODUCTION: Academic research has value well beyond personal financial gain. However, these endeavors do require a notable amount of time and opportunity cost. Academic productivity may raise a researcher's profile within the field, increasing the likelihood for interactions with the medical industry and possibly cultivating relationships with future monetary significance. METHODS: Queries of the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services publicly available Open Payments System allowed for extraction of industry compensation data for orthopaedic surgeons. Aggregate data produce three compensation groups (mean annual income) for individual physicians: none; 1 to $100,000; and >$100,000. Physicians in the highest income category were matched 1:1 with physicians in each of the other two compensation groups. Selected physicians then underwent an academic productivity assessment. Queries of Web of Science, Scopus, and Google Scholar User Profile databases provided the h-index and m-index for each surgeon. Bivariate and multivariate analyses produced statistical results. In addition to the analysis of the tiered income groups, analysis of compensation as a continuous variable also occurred. RESULTS: From 2016 to 2020, 636, 7,617, and 22,091 US orthopaedic surgeons earned mean annual industry compensation >$100,000; between $1 and $100,000; and $0, respectively. Royalties (80.8%) predominated in the top earning group, compared with Consulting Fees (46.5%) in the second-tier group. The highest income group had higher h-index ($0 versus $1 to 100,000 versus >$100,000 = 3.6 versus 7.5 versus 20.0, P < 0.001) and m-index ($0 versus $1 to 100,000 versus >$100,000 = 0.26 versus 0.44 versus 0.80, P < 0.001) scores than either the intermediate or no compensation groups. In addition, h-index and m-index correlated positively with total compensation (h-index: r = 0.32, P < 0.001; m-index: r = 0.20, P < 0.001). Multivariable analysis of factors associated with increased industry compensation identified h-index (B = 0.034, P < 0.001) and years active (B = 0.042, P < 0.001) as having significant associations with physician compensation. Physician subspecialty also correlated with industry compensation. DISCUSSION: Academic research can provide invaluable contributions to the improvement of patient care. These efforts often require notable personal sacrifice with minimal direct remuneration. However, academic productivity metrics correlate positively with industry compensation, highlighting a possible supplementary benefit to scholarly efforts. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level III.

Long-run growth of ambulatory surgery centers 1990-2015 and Medicare payment policy.

OBJECTIVE: To examine long-run growth in the ambulatory surgery center (ASC) industry and potential factors influencing its trajectory. DATA SOURCES: National data for all Medicare-certified ASCs (1990-2015) and outpatient discharge records from the state of Florida in 2007. STUDY DESIGN: We documented the number of ASCs in the United States over time and decomposed the trend into underlying ASC market entry and exit behavior. We then examined the plausibility of 2008 Medicare payment reforms to influence the trend changes. DATA EXTRACTION METHODS: Data on ASC openings and closures are obtained from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Provider of Service files. Secondary data on ASC volume in Florida are obtained from the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The number of ASCs in the United States grew 5%-10% annually between 1990 and 2007 but by 1% or less beginning in 2008. This change coincided with substantive reductions in Medicare payments for key ASC services. The annual number of new ASCs was as much as 50% lower following the payment change. CONCLUSIONS: ASCs are an important competitor for outpatient services, but growth has slowed dramatically. Sharp changes in new ASC entry align with less generous Medicare fees.

How Did Orthopaedic Surgeons Perform in the 2018 Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System?

BACKGROUND: The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is the latest value-based payment program implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. As performance-based bonuses and penalties continue to rise in magnitude, it is essential to evaluate this program's ability to achieve its core objectives of quality improvement, cost reduction, and competition around clinically meaningful outcomes. QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: We asked the following: (1) How do orthopaedic surgeons differ on the MIPS compared with surgeons in other specialties, both in terms of the MIPS scores and bonuses that derive from them? (2) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving penalties based on the MIPS? (3) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving a perfect score of 100 based on the MIPS? METHODS: Scores from the 2018 MIPS reporting period were linked to physician demographic and practice-based information using the Medicare Part B Provider Utilization and Payment File, the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System Data (NPPES), and National Physician Compare Database. For all orthopaedic surgeons identified within the Physician Compare Database, there were 15,210 MIPS scores identified, representing a 72% (15,210 of 21,124) participation rate in the 2018 MIPS. Those participating in the MIPS receive a final score (0 to 100, with 100 being a perfect score) based on a weighted calculation of performance metrics across four domains: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and costs. In 2018, orthopaedic surgeons had an overall mean ± SD score of 87 ± 21. From these scores, payment adjustments are determined in the following manner: scores less than 15 received a maximum penalty adjustment of -5% ("penalty"), scores equal to 15 did not receive an adjustment ("neutral"), scores between 15 and 70 received a positive adjustment ("positive"), and scores above 70 (maximum 100) received both a positive adjustment and an additional exceptional performance adjustment with a maximum adjustment of +5% ("bonus"). Adjustments among orthopaedic surgeons were compared across various demographic and practice characteristics. Both the mean MIPS score and the resulting payment adjustments were compared with a group of surgeons in other subspecialties. Finally, multivariable logistic regression models were generated to identify which variables were associated with increased odds of receiving a penalty as well as a perfect score of 100. RESULTS: Compared with surgeons in other specialties, orthopaedic surgeons' mean MIPS score was 4.8 (95% CI 4.3 to 5.2; p < 0.001) points lower. From this difference, a lower proportion of orthopaedic surgeons received bonuses (-5.0% [95% CI -5.6 to -4.3]; p < 0.001), and a greater proportion received penalties (+0.5% [95% CI 0.2 to 0.8]; p < 0.001) and positive adjustments (+4.6% [95% CI 6.1 to 10.7]; p < 0.001) compared with surgeons in other specialties. After controlling for potentially confounding variables such as gender, years in practice, and practice setting, small (1 to 49 members) group size (adjusted odds ratio 22.2 [95% CI 8.17 to 60.3]; p < 0.001) and higher Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) scores (aOR 2.32 [95% CI 1.35 to 4.01]; p = 0.002) were associated with increased odds of a penalty. Also, after controlling for potential confounding, we found that reporting through an alternative payment model (aOR 28.7 [95% CI 24.0 to 34.3]; p < 0.001) was associated with increased odds of a perfect score, whereas small practice size (1 to 49 members) (aOR 0.35 [95% CI 0.31 to 0.39]; p < 0.001), a high patient volume (greater than 500 Medicare patients) (aOR 0.82 [95% CI 0.70 to 0.95]; p = 0.01), and higher HCC score (aOR 0.79 [95% Cl 0.66 to 0.93]; p = 0.006) were associated with decreased odds of a perfect MIPS score. CONCLUSION: Collectively, orthopaedic surgeons performed well in the second year of the MIPS, with 87% earning bonus payments. Among participating orthopaedic surgeons, individual reporting affiliation, small practice size, and more medically complex patient populations were associated with higher odds of receiving penalties and lower odds of earning a perfect score. Based on these findings, we recommend that individuals and orthopaedic surgeons in small group practices strive to forge partnerships with larger hospital practices with adequate ancillary staff to support quality reporting initiatives. Such partnerships may help relieve surgeons of growing administrative obligations and allow for maintained focus on direct patient care activities. Policymakers should aim to produce a shortened panel of performance measures to ensure more standardized comparison and less time and energy diverted from established clinical workflows. The current MIPS scoring methodology should also be amended with a complexity modifier to ensure fair evaluation of surgeons practicing in the safety net setting, or those treating patients with a high comorbidity burden. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level III, therapeutic study.

Current Interventional Radiology-Related Benchmarked Clinical Quality Measures Are Less Likely to be "Capped" Than Diagnostic Radiology Clinical Quality Measures.

In the merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS), quality measures are considered topped out if national median performance rates are ≥95%. Quality measures worth 10 points can be capped at 7 points if topped out for ≥2 years. This report compares the availability of diagnostic radiology (DR)-related and interventional radiology (IR)-related measures worth 10 points. A total of 196 MIPS clinical quality measures were reviewed on the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services MIPS website. There are significantly more IR-related measures worth 10 points than DR measures (2/9 DR measures vs 9/12 IR measures; P = .03), demonstrating that clinical IR services can help mixed IR/DR groups maximize their Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services payment adjustment.

Procedure Reimbursement, Inflation, and the Declining Buying Power of the Vascular Surgeon (2011-2021).

PURPOSE: The purpose of this study was to evaluate trends in Medicare reimbursement for common vascular procedures over the last decade. To enrich the context of this analysis, vascular procedure reimbursement is directly compared to inflation-adjusted changes in other surgical specialties. METHODS: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Physician/Supplier Procedure Summary file was utilized to identify the 20 procedures most commonly performed by vascular surgeons from 2011-2021. A similar analysis was performed for orthopedic, general, and neurological surgeons. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Physician-Fee Schedule Look-Up Tool was queried for each procedure, and reimbursement data was extracted. All monetary data was adjusted for inflation to 2021 dollars utilizing the consumer price index. Average year-over-year and total percentage change in reimbursement were calculated based on adjusted data for included procedures. Comparisons to other specialty data were made with ANOVA. RESULTS: From 2011-2021, the average, unadjusted change in reimbursement for vascular procedures was -7.2%. Accounting for inflation, the average procedural reimbursement declined by 20.1%. The greatest decline was observed in phlebectomy of varicose veins (-50.6%). Open arteriovenous fistula revision was the only vascular procedure with an increase in inflation-adjusted reimbursement (+7.5%). Year-over-year, inflation-adjusted reimbursement for common vascular procedures decreased by 2.0% per year. Venous procedures experienced the largest decrease in average adjusted reimbursement (-42.4%), followed by endovascular (-20.1%) and open procedures (-13.9%). These changes were significantly different across procedural subgroups (P < 0.001). During the same period, the average adjusted change in reimbursement for the 20 most common procedures in orthopedic surgery, general surgery, and neurosurgery was -11.6% vs. -20.1% for vascular surgery (P = 0.004). CONCLUSION: Medicare reimbursement for common surgical procedures has declined over the last decade. While absolute reimbursement has remained relatively stable for several procedures, accounting for a decade of inflation demonstrates the true diminution of buying power for equivalent work. The most alarming observation is that vascular surgeons have faced a disproportionate decrease in inflation-adjusted reimbursement in comparison to other surgical specialists. Awareness of these trends is a crucial first step towards improved advocacy and efforts to ensure the "value" of vascular surgery does not continue to erode.

Exploring the rapid expansion of office-based laboratories and peripheral vascular interventions across the United States.

OBJECTIVE: To characterize the relationship between office-based laboratory (OBL) use and Medicare payments for peripheral vascular interventions (PVI). METHODS: Using the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Provider Utilization and Payment Data Public Use Files from 2014 to 2017, we identified providers who performed percutaneous transluminal angioplasty, stent placement, and atherectomy. Procedures were aggregated at the provider and hospital referral region (HRR) level. RESULTS: Between 2014 and 2017, 2641 providers performed 308,247 procedures. The mean payment for OBL stent placement in 2017 was $4383.39, and mean payment for OBL atherectomy was $13,079.63. The change in the mean payment amount varied significantly, from a decrease of $16.97 in HRR 146 to an increase of $43.77 per beneficiary over the study period in HRR 11. The change in the rate of PVI also varied substantially, and moderately correlated with change in payment across HRRs (R2 = 0.40; P < .001). The majority of HRRs experienced an increase in rate of PVI within OBLs, which strongly correlated with changes in payments (R2 = 0.85; P < .001). Furthermore, 85% of the variance in change in payment was explained by increases in OBL atherectomy (P < .001). CONCLUSIONS: A rapid shift into the office setting for PVIs occurred within some HRRs, which was highly geographically variable and was strongly correlated with payments. Policymakers should revisit the current payment structure for OBL use and, in particular atherectomy, to better align the policy with its intended goals.

Trends in Neurosurgical Practice Size: Increased Consolidation 2014-2019.

BACKGROUND: Practice consolidation in healthcare has widespread consequences for providers and patients. Although many studies describe this phenomenon in various medical specialties, no such analysis has been performed in neurosurgery specifically. The goal of this study was to assess the trends in the size of U.S. neurosurgery practices over a 5-year period. METHODS: Neurosurgery practice characteristics were obtained from the Medicare Physician Compare database from March 2014 through October 2019 on the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Website. Neurosurgeons were separated on the basis of their practice size. Group practice sizes ranged from solo practitioner practice to large multispecialty groups and health organizations. Eight groups were identified (1 or 2, 3-9, 10-24, 25-49, 50-99, 100-499, 500-999, and ≥1000 members). Additionally, neurosurgery practices were analyzed across the 4 U.S. geographical regions to understand changes in practice size and distribution. RESULTS: The percentage of neurosurgeons in smaller practices of 1 or 2 members decreased, from 20.09% to 13.05%; 3-9 members, from 17.79% to 9.41%; and 10-24 members, from 10.53% to 8.0%. The largest increase was seen in health organizations of 1000 members or more, with an increase from 9.85% to 22.84%. CONCLUSIONS: This study shows that over the past 5 years, a substantial trend toward increasing practice sizes has evolved. The effect of the differences in practice size should be examined to determine the large-scale impacts on patient care, payment models, and healthcare access, in addition to neurosurgeon compensation, and satisfaction.

Medicare Reimbursement Trends for Interventional Radiology Procedures: 2012 to 2020.

PURPOSE: To investigate the reimbursement trends for interventional radiology (IR) procedures from 2012 to 2020. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Reimbursement data from the Physician Fee Schedule look-up tool from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services was compiled for 20 common IR procedures. The authors then investigated compensation trends after adjusting for inflation and from the unadjusted data between 2012 and 2020. RESULTS: From 2012 to 2020, the mean unadjusted reimbursement for procedures decreased by -6.9% (95% confidence interval [CI], -13.5% to -0.34%). This trend was even more profound after inflation was taken into account, with a mean decline in adjusted reimbursement of -18.7% (95% CI, -24.4% to -12.9%) during the study period, with a mean yearly decline of -2.8%. The difference between the mean unadjusted and adjusted payment amounts was significant (P = .012). Similarly, linear regression analysis of the adjusted average reimbursement across all procedures revealed an overall decline from 2012 to 2020 (R2 = 0.97), indicating a steady decline in reimbursement over time. CONCLUSIONS: In just under a decade, IR has experienced significant reimbursement cuts by Medicare, as demonstrated by both the unadjusted and inflation-adjusted payment trends. Knowledge of these trends is critically important for practicing interventional radiologists, leaders within the field, and legislators, who may play a role in formulating future reimbursement schedules for IR. These data may be used to help support more amenable reimbursement plans to sustain and facilitate the growth of the specialty.

The financial evolution of endovascular aneurysm repair delivery in contemporary practice.

OBJECTIVE: The fiscal impact of endovascular repair (EVR) of aortic aneurysms and the requisite device costs have previously highlighted the tenuous long-term financial sustainability among Medicare beneficiaries. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services have since reclassified EVR remuneration paradigms with new Medicare Severity Diagnosis-Related Groups (MS-DRGs) intended to better address the procedure's cost profile. The impact of this change remains unknown. The purpose of this analysis was to compare EVR-specific costs and revenue among Medicare beneficiaries both before and after this change. METHODS: All infrarenal EVRs performed in fiscal years (FYs) 2014 and 2015, before the MS-DRG change, and those performed in FYs 2017 and 2018, after the MS-DRG change, were identified using the DRG codes 238 (n = 108) and 269 (n = 84), respectively. We then identified those who were treated according to the instructions for use guidelines with a single manufacturer's device and billed to Medicare (n = 23 in FY14-15; n = 22 in FY17-18). From these cohorts, we determined total procedure technical costs, technical revenue, and net technical margin in conjunction with the hospital finance department. Results were then compared between these two groups. RESULTS: The two cohorts demonstrated similar demographic profiles (FY14-15 vs FY17-18 cohort: age, 78 years vs 74 years; median length of stay, 1.0 day vs 1.0 day). Mean total technical costs were slightly higher in the FY17-18 group ($24,511 in FY14-15 vs $26,445 in FY17-18). Graft implants continued to account for a significant portion of the total cost, with the device cost accounting for 56% of the total procedure costs in both cohorts. Net revenue was greater in the FY17-18 group by $5800 ($30,698 in FY14-15 vs $36,498 in FY17-18), resulting in an increased overall margin in the FY17-18 group compared with the FY14-15 group ($6188 in FY14-15 vs $10,053 in FY17-18). CONCLUSIONS: Device costs remain the single greatest cost driver associated with EVR delivery. DRG reclassification of EVR to address total procedure and implant costs appears to better address the requisite associated procedure costs and may thereby better support long-term fiscal sustainability of this procedure for hospitals and health systems alike.

A neuromuscular-based analysis of the open payments program.

INTRODUCTION: In August 2013, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Open Payments Program (OPP) made eligible payment information publicly available. Data about industry payments to neuromuscular neurologists are lacking. METHOD: Financial relationships were investigated between industry and US neuromuscular neurologists from January 2014 through December 2018 using the CMS OPP database. RESULTS: The total annual payments increased more than 6-fold during the study period. The top 10% of physician-beneficiaries collected 80% to 90% of total industry payments except in 2014. In 2018, the most common drugs associated with payments to neuromuscular neurologists were nusinersen, vortioxetine, eteplirsen, alglucosidase alpha, edaravone, and intravenous immunoglobulin. DISCUSSION: A substantial increase in the annual payments to neuromuscular physicians during the study period is likely due to the development of new treatments, including gene therapy.

Financial viability of endovascular aortic repair in the modern era.

BACKGROUND: In the current era of cost containment, the financial impact of high-cost procedures such as endovascular aneurysm repair (EVAR) remains an area of intensive interest. Previous reports suggested slim to negative operating margins with EVAR, prompting widespread initiatives to reduce cost and to improve reimbursement. In 2015, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) announced the reclassification of EVAR to more specific diagnosis-related group (DRG) coding and predicted an overall increase in hospital reimbursement. The potential impact of this change has not been described. METHODS: Patients undergoing elective EVAR at a single institution between January 2014 and December 2018 were identified retrospectively, then stratified by date. Group 1 patients underwent EVAR before DRG change in 2015 and were classified with DRG 237/238, major cardiovascular procedure. Group 2 patients underwent EVAR after the change and were classified as DRG 268/269, aortic/heart assist procedures. The total direct cost included implant cost, operating room (OR) labor, room and board, and other supply costs. Net revenue reflected real payer mix values without extrapolation based on standard Medicare rates. Hospital profit was defined as the contribution to indirect (CTI), subtracting total direct cost from net revenue. RESULTS: A total of 188 encounters were included, 67 (36%) in group 1 and 121 (64%) in group 2. Medicare patients composed 84% of group 1 and 81% of group 2. CTI (profit) increased by $4447 (+123%) from $3615 in group 1 to $8062 in group 2. Net revenue per encounter increased by $2054 (+7.1%). In group 1, the higher reimbursement DRG code 237 was applied in 5 of 67 (7.5%) patients, whereas DRG code 268 was assigned in 19 of 121 (15.1%) patients in group 2. Total direct cost per encounter decreased by $2012 (-7.9%). This decrease in cost was driven by a reduction in implant cost, from a mean $16,914 per encounter in group 1 to a mean $15,655 in group 2 (-$1259 or -7.4% per encounter) and by a decrease in OR labor cost, $2838 in group 1 to $2361 in group 2 (-$477 or -17.0% per encounter). CONCLUSIONS: A significant improvement in hospital CTI was observed for elective EVAR during the course of the study. The increased DRG reimbursement after the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services coding changes in 2015 was a major driver of this salutary change. Notably, efforts to reduce implant and OR cost as well as to improve coding and documentation accuracy over time had an equally important impact on financial return.